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Glossary of terms
CAV   Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
CIEHF  Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors
DDT   Dynamic Driving Task
DSM   Driver State Monitoring
HMI   Human Machine Interface
NHTSA	 	 National	Highway	Traffic	Safety	Administration
NTSB   National Transportation Safety Board
ODD   Occupational Design Domain
OEDR  Object and Event Detection and Response
SAE   Society of Automotive Engineers
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future. 
Drawing from expertise across the CIEHF community, this report introduces some of the human 
factors aspects related to vehicle automation. 
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improve life, wellbeing and performance. This involves the disciplines of design, engineering, 
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Executive summary
This document discusses a fatal crash from March 23, 2018 involving a Tesla Model X using the 
partially automated ‘Autopilot’ function. It provides a critique of the NTSB’s report and examines 
the findings from a human factors perspective to contribute towards an enhanced understanding 
of the circumstances related to this crash. It concludes with areas for open discussion, 
recommendations for future investigation and five findings of worthwhile of further consideration.
•  We question whether ‘driver distraction’ is an appropriate classification for a “probable cause” 
of the crash. 
•  We disagree that “familiarization with the vehicle” was not a contributing factor related to this 
crash. 
•  We question the conclusion that driver qualification was not a contributing factor related to this 
crash.  
•  We highlight the need for regulatory bodies to ensure effective driver state monitoring and urge 
for regulation on minimum requirements for driver state monitoring in partially automated 
vehicles.
•  We highlight the importance of human-machine interface design in a human-machine shared 
system and urge for regulation on minimum requirements of such systems within partially 
automated vehicles.
And in doing so we highlight the importance for a human factors perspective of such events.
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Introduction
On March 23, 2018 a Tesla ‘Model X’ collided with a damaged and non-operational crash 
attenuator resulting in the tragic death of the vehicle occupant. In response to this event, the US 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a preliminary report discussing the lead-up 
to the event as well as conclusions and recommendations for the transport sector and relevant 
stakeholders. This report is referenced as NTSB/HAR-20/01 Adopted February 25, 2020 (National 
Transportation Saftey Board, 2018). A productive analysis of this event requires consideration of 
many new (to the automotive world) factors, due to the complex human-system shared 
responsibility that is present in partially automated driving. To benefit the NTSB and associated 
stakeholders, the NTSB report has been critiqued from a human factors perspective and this 
document identifies some areas for further consideration both within this specific report, and for 
future investigations involving partially automated driving systems.
The tragic event being discussed ultimately resulted in the loss of life, and we must be sensitive to 
this point. However, this does not excuse the need for a comprehensive review and critique of the 
human factors issues that may have contributed to the event. It is hoped that through an honest 
and productive critique of the conclusions and recommendations proposed by the NTSB, we can 
positively impact the safety of vehicles and regulation surrounding the safe operation of partially 
automated vehicles in the future. 
As is common with retrospective analyses of incidents, there are numerous complex and 
contributing factors involved. Many of these were highlighted by the NTSB including: road layouts, 
crash structures and software dependencies/limitations, as well as Operational Design Domain 
(ODD). As human factors experts we shall address only the points where we may be most 
productive, and aim to address some of these human factors considerations within this particular 
event which have been identified and summarised as:
•  Driver Distraction
•  Driver Responsibility 
•  Driver Training
•  Human Machine Interface (HMI)
•  Driver State Monitoring (DSM)
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Background 
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) categorise levels of driving automation from L0 to L5 
(where ‘L’ is used as an abbreviation for ‘Level’). These levels range from no driving automation 
(L0) to a full driving automation (L5). A Level 5 vehicle is often referred to as an ‘autonomous 
vehicle’. The SAE provides detailed information on the features and limitations of each level within 
the report ref: J3016_201806 (SAE International, 2018) and a summary table is presented below:
Figure 2 (SAE International, 2018)
‘DDT’: Dynamic Driving Task. 
‘OEDR’: Object and Event Detection and Response
‘ODD’: Operational Design Domain









Driver Performs part or all of the DDT
0 No Driving Automation
The performance by the driver of the entire 
DDT, even when enhanced by active safety 
systems.
Driver Driver Driver n/a
1 Driver Assistance
The sustained and ODD-specific execution by 
a driving automation system of either the 
lateral or the longitudinal vehicle motion 
control subtask of the DDT (but not both 
simultaneously) with the expectation that the 
driver performs the remainder of the DDT
Driver and  





The sustained and ODD-specific execution by 
a driving automation system of both the lateral 
and longitudinal vehicle motion control 
subtasks of the DDT with the expectation that 
the driver completes the OEDR subtask and 
supervises the driving automation system.
System Driver Driver Limited













the sustained and ODD-specific performance 
by an ADS of the entire DDT with the 
expectation that the DDT fallback-ready user is 
receptive to ADS-issued requests to intervene, 
as well as to DDT performance-relevant 






The sustained and ODD-specific performance 
by an ADS of the entire DDT and DDT falback 
without any expectation that a user will 
respond to a request to intervene 





The sustained and unconditional (i.e., not 
ODD-specific) performance by an ADS of the 
entire DDT and DDT fallback without any 
expectation that a user will respond to a 
request to intervene.
System System System Unlimited
8     Understanding Misuse of Partially Automated Vehicles – A Discussion of NTSB’s Findings of the 2018 Mountain View Tesla Crash
Level 2 (Partial driving automation) has been highlighted in the above figure as this is of most 
interest to this report where there is common agreement that the Tesla Autopilot system fits the 
criteria for a Level 2 classification (van Huysduynen, Terken, & Eggen, 2018.)
 
Recent Tesla vehicles may come equipped with Tesla’s ‘Autopilot’ feature which advertises to 
“steer, accelerate and brake automatically within its lane” (Tesla, 2020) when activated. This 
system is classified as a Level 2 system – partial driving automation. 
One important aspect of this level is the shared responsibility of the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) 
– which is split into the ‘sustained lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion control’ and the ‘Object 
and Event Detection and Response’ (OEDR). This split in driving responsibility is a key feature of 
this report. The SAE goes on to explain in their definitions the responsibility of the human driver 
when a L2 system is activated such as when using the ‘Tesla Autopilot’ system:
Figure 3 A detailed explanation of SAE Level 2 (SAE International, 2018)
Ultimately, when the ‘Autopilot’ system is engaged, it is the driver who is ‘driving’ and they are 
required to monitor both the automated driving system, and the road ahead for any objects or 
events – responding appropriately and retaking full control where needed. With an understanding 
of these systems, we can begin to understand some of the background to the road collision on 
March 23, 2018. 
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Driver Distraction
The NSTB report identifies that the driver, leading up to the crash, was engaged with a mobile 
phone game ‘application’. The NTSB reports “driver distraction” linked to this mobile phone use 
was one of the probable causes of this crash. In this instance we consider this classification of 
‘driver distraction’ insufficient for understanding the underlying cause(s) of this event and we 
believe this classification may limit the ability to further understand other contributing factors 
related to this crash. 
The idea of ‘distraction’ implies diversion of attention away from a primary task to something 
perhaps unrelated to the primary task. By implication therefore, one must be involved in a primary 
task in order to be distracted from it. Understanding what this means in a driving context is widely 
discussed in the literature, one particularly useful source attempts a taxonomy of driver distraction 
(Regan, Hallett, & Gordon, 2011). Here they discuss the concept of voluntary/involuntary 
distraction and subsequent voluntary/involuntary diverted attention (p 1778). 
In the case of this Tesla crash there appears to be voluntary diversion of attention from the 
primary driving task; this would be uncommon in a traditional (non-automated) vehicle, but 
facilitated when using partially automated driving systems even though this might be in violation 
of system intended use. If the ‘driver’s’ primary task is not driving, designs embedded in the 
driving task intended to influence human behaviour and nudge attention may be ineffective. 
(Pettitt, Burnett, & Stevens, 2005) explore driver distraction and example the concept of internal 
distraction - that is distraction caused by driver actions. Their work also gives insight on how 
traditional ‘driver distraction’ terminology relies on ISO definitions which relate to ‘driver 
performance’ in non-automated vehicles (ISO, 2004). In a partially automated vehicle, the measure 
of ‘driving performance’ is dissimilar to a non-automated vehicle, and this identifies the need for 
more thorough understanding of the appropriateness of the term ‘driver distraction’ in instances 
related to partially-automated vehicles. 
Despite the multiple definitions of ‘distraction’ and irrespective of the level of vehicle automation, 
there are many commonalities between various definitions, in that they mostly describe the 
momentary diversion of attention away from the primary task. Possibly the most widely used 
definition of driver distraction (across both academia and industry) is given by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) which states:
“Distraction means the diversion of a driver’s attention from activities critical for safe operation 
and control of a vehicle to a competing activity” (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
p. 243)
Distraction is considered using the three categories of visual, manual, and cognitive distraction.   
NHTSA recommend that device-based tasks can be completed using glances of 2 seconds or 
less, with a total eyes-off-the-road time of 12 seconds or less (NHTSA, 2013).
Considering now the Tesla event, the driver appears to be engaged in their mobile phone game, 
potentially comprising visual, manual, and cognitive distraction. They also had autopilot engaged, 
and log data indicated that hands were off the steering wheel for approximately 1/3 of the time 
since autopilot was instigated. It is possible that there were extended periods (i.e. >12s) prior to 
the crash when the driver was inattentive to the driving task. The scenario cannot be assumed to 
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be classified as a delay in receiving information necessary to safely maintain safe driving. Rather, 
we argue the driver was inattentive to the driving task. Where driver inattention may be defined as:
“insufficient or no attention to activities critical for safe driving” (Regan, Hallett, & Gordon, 2011, p. 
1780)
The SAE definitions make it quite clear that when the L2 system is active, the driver of the vehicle 
should have been fully attentive to the road (Object and Event Detection and Response or ‘OEDR’) 
whilst also supervising the Autopilot system. Tesla also promote this responsibility when for 
example updating to V8.0 Autopilot software (2017) the information is given “you need to maintain 
control and responsibility of your vehicle while enjoying the convenience of Autopilot”. In the 
Mountain View crash, the driver was not adequately performing their OEDR responsibilities and 
hence neglectful to their responsibility for the dynamic driving task. The lack of action from the 
driver prior to the collision is a key factor in this event where it may have been possible to avoid 
this altogether if proper supervision and OEDR responsibilities were undertaken. 
Conclusively, we highlight the NSTB’s classification of ‘driver distraction’ would benefit from more 
precision, where a lack of precision is potentially limiting for further understanding of how to 
improve the safety of partially automated systems in the future. Working with this proposed 
reclassification of ‘distraction’ to ‘inattention’, we are now able to look to understand exactly why 
this driver was inattentive and disregardful to their responsibilities. For this we continue to explore 
this concept of OEDR and navigate the complexities of this at both a consumer, and system level.
Driver Responsibility; OEDR and System 
Monitoring
The SAE definition of a Level 2 partially automated driving system is defined as (Figure 2):
“The sustained and ODD-specific execution by a driving automation system of both the lateral 
and longitudinal vehicle motion control subtasks of the DDT with the expectation that the driver 
completes the OEDR subtask and supervises the driving automation system” (SAE International, 
2018)  ‘DDT’: Dynamic Driving Task. ‘OEDR’: Object and Event Detection and Response. ‘ODD’: 
Operational Design Domain
The definition places the driver as bearing sole responsibility for the sustained completion of the 
OEDR task. Consequently, this means that the driver must be ready to resume control of the 
vehicle at any time. Hence there can be no period of time during the partially automated drive, 
that a driver can disengage from the OEDR task. Further, with a supervisory aspect to the driver’s 
responsibility, one must assume failures within the automated ‘sustained lateral and longitudinal 
control’ are possible. From this definition alone, it can be argued that Level 2 automation is 
unambiguous inasmuch the driver must pay attention at all times, or the system is effectively 
being misused (intentionally or otherwise).
Whilst the SAE levels of automation might be well-defined within the industry, expectations and 
responsibilities associated with them are not understood by the general public, including owners 
of vehicles with such capability.  The nuances regarding responsibility for the OEDR, are very 
much in the expert domain of those who work in the field of ‘connected and autonomous vehicles’ 
(CAV). There remains a question of education and training for drivers to ensure that they 
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understand what a vehicle is and is not capable of.  Training can be administered through multiple 
conduits including vehicle dealerships, training videos, websites, manuals etc. 
However, all of these can be bypassed by the user and there is no regulation for mandating 
training. Furthermore, certification with one vehicle would not necessarily transfer to another even 
if classified within the same SAE level. 
The vehicle itself provides an opportunity for training and guiding the user through the human-
machine interface (HMI). The vehicle’s HMI provides the possibility to enable/enhance the safe 
operation of the vehicle through effective communication to the driver and assuring they are 
aware of system status and operation parameters. However, there is little evidence of the 
effectiveness of HMI-based guidance for any manufacturer and a gap in the safety literature is 
identified.
Despite the relatively clear SAE Level 2 definition placing responsibility on the driver for OEDR and 
system monitoring, the reality is that its implementation in vehicles is non-standardised, complex, 
and involves multiple vehicle systems. As the number of manufacturers and vehicles featuring 
Level 2 capabilities increases, an increasing number of control and engagement interfaces are 
implemented, resulting in potential confusion of OEDR monitoring responsibilities and HMI 
feedback. Tesla require continuous contact with the steering wheel and measures torque input 
during Autopilot operation – providing alerts if no steering wheel input is felt after a time delay. 
Nissan’s ProPilot system relies on a similar steering wheel input to determine attentiveness. GM’s 
super cruise system uses head movement tracking to infer driver attention to the road and Audi’s 
AI traffic jam pilot proposes a combination of head and eye tracking cameras. However, as yet, 
there is no evidence in the published literature to show the effectiveness of these systems for 
sustained OEDR assurance for real-world naturalistic conditions. 
One well-established paradox of automation is that as any system becomes more proficient at 
being automated, the incentive for the human operator to maintain attention reduces.  
Workarounds can be sought when a system is perceived as low-risk even if a violation of training 
(e.g. wedging open fire doors).   Similarly ‘alarm fatigue’ results in desensitisation to a familiar 
warning signal if it is over-used.  In the case of vehicle automation, one must expect that, as 
systems become more reliable, drivers will lose incentive to maintain vigilance, that workarounds 
might be used (e.g. small steering forces to ‘fool’ the system), and alarms are likely to be 
perceived as reducing in urgency the more familiar they become.
In the case of the Mountain View crash, the driver was familiar with the car and the autopilot 
system, and may have potentially placed more trust in the system than a naïve driver.
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Driver Familiarisation 
The NTSB report concludes that driver familiarity with the vehicle was not a contributing factor in 
this crash. This can be challenged inasmuch that the driver may have developed over-trust in the 
system precisely due to their familiarity with it. 
The NTSB report appears to interpret ‘familiarity of the system’ in a manner such that, from a 
basic perspective, the driver knew how to operate the system which must be correct given the 
Autopilot system was manually turned on. The interpretation of ‘familiarity’ is challenged here,  
as the driver’s experience and cognitive model of the system was based on when it maintained 
control of the car.  Prior to the introduction of level 2 systems, it was not necessary for a driver to 
be aware of, for example, ODD boundaries of a system because the responsibility of the driver 
was never in doubt. Therefore, a traditional definition or understanding used to assess a driver’s 
familiarity with the system did not need to include elements that we now understand are important 
for a partially automated driving system. For the first time in the automotive domain we are faced 
with new concepts of shared control and the requisite responsibilities of the driver, knowledge of 
limitations and capabilities of the system. We believe there to be benefit in reviewing the 
interpretation of ‘driver familiarisation’ and therefore conclusions on the level of familiarisation.
Misinformation and lack of information with regard to driver education of a partially automated 
system is particularly important to recognise. Tesla have been criticised for their use of the name 
‘Autopilot’ for their partially automated system. With Munich’s Regional Court going as far to ban 
all future use of Tesla’s “Autopilot” and “Full Self Driving” names in Germany (Taylor, 2020), forcing 
a rebrand to ‘autodrive’ to protect users from being ‘misled’ about system capabilities. There is no 
doubt that this partially automated driving system is an exciting technology, and there is myriad 
consumer-created content online that many of the same technology-interested owners of such 
vehicles will undoubtably explore. Consumer YouTube videos and other media outlets frequently 
demonstrate inappropriate and dangerous driver behaviour as entertainment, but providing 
misleading information on capability of current automation systems. This is counterproductive to 
ensuring driver familiarity and correct expectations of automation systems. 
The enthusiasm surrounding the current capability of Level 2 technology, and the misinformation 
this causes, is adding to the risk that drivers over-estimate the vehicle’s capabilities, influencing 
how they interact and engage in their OEDR responsibility. We believe factors related to over-trust 
and a lack of system understanding to be contributory factors in the Mountain View crash. 
Furthermore, in this particular case, it is likely that the familiarity of this route to the driver (e.g. 
daily commute) coupled with the ability of the partially automated system to be ‘good enough’ to 
navigate the route up to this point had a cumulative effect on the driver’s likelihood to disengage 
with their OEDR responsibilities, despite the driver’s knowledge that the system had previously 
had sensor issues at this point in the journey. In other words the driver’s incorrect mental model  
of the system capabilities (over trust) seems to have been reinforced by the absence of an 
emergency/collision, despite an incidence of system uncertainty. 
The NTSB report concludes that driver qualification was not a contributing factor. Whilst qualified, 
it could be argued that training should be mandated, to ensure familiarisation before operating  
a Level 2 partially automated vehicle. As such, requirements for driver education should be 
considered by regulatory and licencing agencies as the automotive industry progresses into  
an increasingly automated future, to ensure that the potential safety benefits are delivered fully.
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Human Machine Interface for a Human-
Machine Shared Task
Whilst there is precedent for the consideration of training in the future use of automated systems, 
there remains no standard to educate drivers on the specific capabilities of an implementation of 
an automated system.  Different partially automated systems vary in their capability to read lane 
markings, for example, or perform to different degrees of success during challenging conditions, 
such as bright sunlight or rain. With this in mind, there must be a consideration for how drivers 
can be better educated either prior to and/or during their use of the system. 
The SAE (and manufacturers’ guidance) place responsibility on the driver for constant supervision 
of the automated system. But how might one monitor such a system, and does this strict 
requirement neglect to recognise the complexity and demand on the driver to monitor the 
system? Studies have found that the cognitive demand during monitoring of a partially automated 
vehicle is far greater than that of manual driving (Griffin, Young, & Stanton, 2010) (Walker, et al., 
2010). Furthermore, a detrimental effect on the quality of driving immediately following a handover 
can be seen for up to 40 seconds (Merat, et al., 2014). It is unreasonable to expect all drivers to 
be as fully aware of the capabilities of a system as the engineers who created it. However, Level 2 
systems such as the Tesla Autopilot require the driver to supervise the system at all times.  
So how might they do this? 
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) serves as the vital conduit between the engineers who 
design the system and the driver; guiding them into their expected role as a monitor of an 
automated process. What is or is not presented on the HMI is of critical importance to the safe 
and appropriate use of a partially automated system. Human factors specialists have been aware 
of this for some time. Outside of the automotive domain, appropriate communication between a 
system and the user has long been recognised as one of the key elements of safe automation 
(Wessel, Altendorf, Schreck, Canpolat, & Flemisch, 2019). 
There must be a minimum threshold for HMI effectiveness if a driver is to safely monitor a 
partiality automated system. Likewise, there must be a minimum threshold for measuring HMI 
effectiveness if the vehicle is to safely monitor the driver’s vigilance to OEDR.  Guidance for 
testing these systems is required.  Alerts, alarms, driver notifications and dialogue principles are 
broadly covered across ISO/TR 16352-2005, ISO 9241-110:2020 and BS EN ISO 15005:2017 
showing capability in standardising driver-focused features for traditional non-automated driving. 
This specific case highlights the urgency to develop these further to cater for partially automated 
systems as well – providing manufactures the means to incorporate their automated technology 
safely and in consideration of the human user.
The NTSB identify “timing of alerts and warnings was insufficient to elicit the driver’s response” 
which seems to be an appropriate conclusion. However, there is a lack of consensus in the 
scientific literature about what type and modality of alerts and warnings are most effective, and 
there is currently no governance on inclusion of such features, or how to force manufacturers to 
comply. In the Mountain View crash journey, the driver received “two visual alerts and one 
auditory alert” due to improper use of the Autopilot system, some time prior to the fatal incident. 
This highlights that resumption of attention might be short-lived even if achieved. ‘Improper use’ 
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was determined by the driver not inputting torque to the steering wheel for a predetermined 
amount of time (3 minutes according to the report – p.15) whilst Autopilot was activated. There 
were no collision avoidance alerts. In line with the NTSBs conclusion, these alerts did not seem  
to be enough to encourage appropriate use of the automated system and avoid the crash. 
Technological innovation in automation of vehicles is progressing faster than standards or 
regulatory bodies can keep up with, and gives manufacturers a competitive advantage. 
Regulators must be agile in defining performance requirements for systems and HMI, to ensure 
effective implementation to enable OEDR and system-monitoring whilst assuring consistency 
between manufacturers.
Driver State Monitoring
The NTSB identifies that the Tesla system did not provide an effective means of monitoring the 
driver’s level of engagement. A Level 2 vehicle is an example of a shared ‘human-machine’ 
responsibility in the automotive world. We understand that during traditional driving, with no 
automation (Level 0) the driver is responsible for the entire dynamic driving task (DDT) comprising  
control of the vehicle and the ‘object and event detection and response’ (OEDR). If the driver 
cannot perform OEDR, and sustained control of the vehicle they should not operate the vehicle 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4 Flow Diagram for L0 (no driving automation)
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Figure 5 Flow Diagram for l2 (parital driving automation)
If a driver is unlicensed, intoxicated, distracted, fatigued or otherwise impaired it is their responsi-
bility to be aware of this and not drive. There is no shared responsibility; all responsibility is with 
the driver. However, in a partially automated vehicle responsibilities for ensuring safe operation are 
shared. The driver must monitor the system (through effective HMI) and the driver must also 
perform the OEDR. It is possible within control loops for an automated vehicle to identify that (for 
example) a sensor is faulty, or a tyre is flat affecting longitudinal and lateral vehicle control. In this 
instance the system would identify it is unsafe to operate. However, as the DDT (dynamic driving 
task) is split between the human and system, it is logically also a requirement of the system to 
check and ensure the driver is performing the OEDR as is required for a complete system. This is 
not an inconsiderable task, identifying presence is rather straight forward, but measuring/inferring 
the visual, manual and cognitive attention of a driver is increasingly complex (considering both 
technology and algorithm design). If the vehicle cannot assure OEDR is being handled, the level 2 
system is incomplete and should not operate. Further to this, with the requirement of the driver to 
be able to monitor the vehicle’s automated system comes a heavy reliance on the vehicle to 
enable this supervision. This is done through the HMI. The Level 0 (manual control) flow chart can 
be expanded to illustrate what this split in DDT responsibility may look like (Figure 5).
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As the diagram in Figure 5 demonstrates, there is a reliance on effective HMI in order for the 
human to supervise the system as required. However, this diagram also shows that the vehicle 
must be aware if the human is correctly handling the OEDR. This is captioned in the function of 
‘system is monitoring driver’ (e.g. Driver State Monitoring or ’DSM’). Without the ability to monitor 
the driver, the theoretical system cannot operate as ‘half’ of the shared system is unaccounted for. 
This diagram is useful for demonstrating how critical this DSM aspect of a partially automated 
system is.
We are in agreement with the NTSB that the Tesla system did not provide an effective means of 
monitoring the drivers level of engagement with the OEDR task. This raises the question whether 
or not the Tesla ‘Autopilot’ system should have been operational. We believe that without a proven 
and robust driver state monitoring system (DSM) a partially automated vehicle should not be able 
to operate. We also note a lack of regulation and standardisation within this area, which makes 
compliance for safe system performance unachievable.
Conclusions 
The SAE levels of automation have provided an important foundation to categorise new vehicle 
automation systems and represent a key first step in the move towards automated vehicle 
technology. However, as we see more varied and diverse solutions being deployed by automobile 
manufacturers, it has become evident that there is a need to standardise, not only the definitions 
of the technology, but the way in which it is implemented too. In a partially automated system 
such as Tesla’s Autopilot, there can be no doubt that there is a responsibility on the driver to 
ensure they use the technology appropriately. However, this responsibility must also be shared 
and enabled by the manufacturer through careful design and testing of the HMI and DSM systems 
that aim to promote its safe use. While increased regulation and standardisation represent an 
important step in developing better and safer partially automated implementations, we believe 
there is also an onus on review bodies to reconsider effective and critical analysis of accidents 
such as that presented in NTSB/HAR-20/01 involving vehicles with increasingly complex 
automation capabilities. We have identified a number of areas that would benefit from further 
consideration and have discussed the reasons for our contention. If issues such as a lack of 
familiarity and qualification in using partially automated systems are deemed to be irrelevant in 
crash scenarios, this sets a precedent of continuing to ignore key human factors effects. In doing 
so we highlight the need for a human factors perspective in the analysis of such complex 
systems. 
As a summary we map what we consider to be four prevalent human factors considerations which 
may have led to this event, and may be likely to lead to more accidents in the future: 
Figure 6 Summary  
of Findings
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